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The objective of this paper is to study the impact of political connection and governance on credit rating and whether there is a substitution or complementary relationship between them.

In order to achieve the objective, a succession of eight ordered probit regressions has been carried out. Moderating variables between the political connection and governance characteristics were introduced. The whole population is taken as a sample, i.e., 27 Tunisian companies that are evaluated by FITSH NORTH AFRICA agencies over a period of 10 years (2009–2018).

The outcomes are mixed. They show that the political connection does not always influence credit rating; the size and board independence always improves credit rating; the duality between the functions affects credit rating; whereas the majorities’ proportion does not influence credit rating; and a substitution between the political connection and the governance characteristics is validated.

Like any other research, our results are factors of our measures and variable choice and depends heavily on the how these variables were conceived. Also, although our number of observations responds to the statistical result generalization requirements, our sample remains relatively narrow with 27 companies only.

In practice, the research will allow investors to have a better vision upon the future of their investments based on whether to develop their governance system or promote political networking. It will also prompt lenders to look beyond ratings and consider factors such as political connections to make a rational judgment on their future placements.

This study leads us to find various solutions: the establishment of credit agencies that take into consideration all the data of all the operators taken as a whole (bank, leasing company, and factoring). It encourages the reorganization of the Tunisian banking sector through mergers for example.

This study is a pioneer in the credit rating field in Tunisia, where the source of debt financing is the most used by all enterprises across all sectors. This study extends the literature of political connection effectiveness, independent directors, board size, in improving corporate performance and credit rating.